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SUSPENSION OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE:
AN EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
Robert A. Fairbanks*
INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma sentencing statutes provide several sentencing
alternatives for trial court consideration after the conviction of a defend-
ant for a criminal offense.: Depending upon the offense and informa-
tion contained in the pre-sentencing report,2 the trial judge, at his dis-
* Charles Evans Hughes Fellow (in residence), Columbia University School of
Law; B.S., University of Oklahoma; M.B.A., Oklahoma City University; J.D., University
of Oklahoma; M.C.J.A., Oklahoma City University.
1. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 991a, 991c (1971). See also Fairbanks, Parole-
A Function of the Judiciary?, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 634, 637-42 (1974).
2. Oklahoma has two statutes that provide for presentence investigations. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 982 (1971) provides:
Upon plea of guilty, or verdict of conviction, in all felony cases, where
the court desires more information, it may make suitable disposition of the cus-
tody of the defendant and request the Department of Pardon and Parole or its
successor to make a study of the defendant. This study shall include, but not
be limited to, the defendant's previous delinquency, his social background, his
capabilities, his mental and physical health, and such other factors as may be
considered pertinent. Within thirty (30) days from the date this request is
made by the court, or within such extended time as the court may allow, the
Pardon and Parole Board shall make a written report to the court, a copy of
such report to be given to the defendant and District Attorney, which shall be
filed with the court clerk, unless otherwise ordered by the court. After re-
ceiving such report, the court shall impose such sentence as he deems war-
ranted, which shall run from the date of the plea of guilty, or conviction.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 519 (Supp. 1974) provides:
Effective January 1, 1975, whenever a person is convicted of a felony, ex-
cept when the death sentence is imposed, the court shall, before imposing sen-
tence to commit any felon to incarceration by the Department of Corrections,
order a presentence investigation to be made by the Division of Probation and
Parole of the Department. The Division shall thereupon inquire into the cir-
cumstances of the offense, and the criminal record, social history and present
condition of the convicted person; and shall make a report of such investiga-
tion to the court, including a recommendation as to appropriate sentence, an'd
specifically a recommendation for or against probation. Such reports must be
presented to the judge so requesting, within a reasonable time, and upon the
failure to so present the same, the judge may proceed with sentencing. When-
ever, in the opinion of the court or the Division it is desirable, the investiga-
tion shall include a physical and mental examination of the convicted person.
The reports so received shall not be referred to, or be considered, in any appeal
1
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cretion,3 may determine that the proper course of action is to suspend,
in whole or in part, execution of incarceration or fine.4 Inconsistently,
however, the Oklahoma statutes further direct that "[e]very person
convicted of murder in the first degree shall suffer death"5 and that
"[e]very person convicted of murder in the second degree shall be
punished by imprisonment . . . for not less than 10 . . . years nor
more than life."" In second degree murder matters the trial court is
directed to enter an indeterminant sentence't consistent with the punish-
ment statutorily prescribed." In drug cases, however, the Oklahoma
Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act9 simply forbids the
proceedings, and such reports shall be confidential with the judge so making
the request; except that the portion dealing with the factual aspects of the re-
port may be reviewed by the district attorney or defendant upon proper cause,
within the discretion of the judge.
See 28 OKLA. L. Rnv. 224 (1975) for a discussion of this section. Note, however, this
discussion concerning OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971) is incomplete. See Fairbanks,
Parole-A Function of the Judiciary?, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 634, 637-42 (1974) for a com-
plete discussion.
The defendant is entitled to a copy of the presentence investigation and report.
Jimenez v. State, 511 P.2d 1144 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Deer v. State, 509 P.2d 687
(Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Owens v. State, 495 P.2d 417 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); No-
land v. State, 495 P.2d 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Jones v. State, 477 P.2d 85 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1970). See Turman v. State, 522 P.2d 247 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974);
Kuerschner v. State, 493 P.2d 1402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). See generally 24 C.I.S.
Criminal Law H§ 1556-1606 (1961); 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law H§ 525-75 (1965).
3. It is within the trial court's discretion to suspend a sentence. Moreover, sus-
pension of sentence is an act of judicial grace. Gore v. State, 482 P.2d 953 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971). Further, the decision to grant a suspension with or without proba-
tion is within the discretion of the sentencing court. Sargent v. State, 509 P.2d 143
(Okla. Crim. App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 497 P.2d 1102 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
The same is true in reference to deferring sentencing. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991c
(1971); Vetter v. State, 506 P.2d 1400 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). See Note, Criminal
Law: Deferred Judgment: A Second Chance for First Offenders, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 454
(1970).
4. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.3 (Supp. 1974). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals is required to provide an automatic review for legal error whenever the death
sentence is imposed. Moreover, the court is required to determine the constitutionality
of the imposition of the death sentence by holding an evidentiary hearing. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 701.5 (Supp. 1974). See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.1-.6 (Supp.
1974). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Pate v. State, 507 P.2d 915
(Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.4 (Supp. 1974).
7. See generally Fraser, Oklahoma's New Judicial System, 21 OKLA. L. Rnv. 373
(1968); Carr, Sentencing Practices, Problems, and Remedies, 53 JuDIcATuRE 74 (1969);
Keve, Sentencing-The Need for Alternatives, 53 JuDIcATuRE 54 (1969); Tydings, En-
suring Rational Sentences-The Case for Appellate Review, 53 JuDIcATUR 68 (1969).
8. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.4 (Supp. 1973).
9. OLA. STAT. tit. 63, H§ 2-401 to -13 (1971). The Oklahoma Uniform Con-
trolled Dangerous Substances Act was enacted into law in 1971. Section 2-401 was
amended on 10 March 1975. The section now reads:
19751
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utilization of "statutory provisions for suspended sentences, deferred
sentences or probation."'10 Although the approach is different, the ef-
fect is the same: The trial court is commanded to enter a sentence
consistent with the appropriate murder or controlled dangerous sub-
stance statute. Therefore, the statutory option to suspend execution
of sentence is not available in murder cases or in certain controlled dan-
gerous substances matters.
Although requiring some reconciliation, the foregoing would seem
to indicate that the sentencing alternatives available to a trial court are
sufficiently delineated and defined. Significantly, such is not the
case. The difficulty stems from relatively recent common law au-
thority emanating from decisions of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
A. Except as authorized by this act, it shall be unlawful for any person:
1. To manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance;
2. To create, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, a counterfeit con-
trolled dangerous substance.
B. Any person who violates this section with respect to:
1. A substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug or
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty (20) years and
a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00). Such sentence shall
not be subject to statutory provisions for suspended sentences, deferred sentences or pro-
bation except where the conviction is for a first offense. The provisions of this para-
graph shall be applicable to all cases under this paragraph whether or not judgment and
sentence on the effective date of this act have become final.
2. Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I, II, III,
or IV is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not
less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years and a fine of not more than Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sentence shall not be subject to statutory provi-
sions for suspended sentences, deferred sentences or probation except where the convic-
tion is for a first offense. The provisions of this paragraph shall be applicable to all
cases under this paragraph whether or not judgment and sentence on the effective date
of this act have become final.
3. A substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a felony and shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than five (5) years and a fine of not
more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).
C. Any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this section is
punishable by a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized and by twice the
fine otherwise authorized. Convictions for second or subsequent violations of this sec-
tion shall not be subject to statutory provisions for suspended sentences, deferred sen-
tences or probation.
D. Any person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and who violates this
section by distributing a controlled dangerous substance to a person under eighteen (18)
years of age is punishable by twice the fine and by twice the imprisonment otherwise
authorized.
10. See, e.g., OIrA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401.B.1 (1971). A similar provision is found
in six places in the Oklahoma Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Act, O1MA.
STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-401 to -13 (1971). See rote 9 supra,
3
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Appeals, the court of last resort in Oklahoma criminal matters,"
that indicates that the trial court has the "inherent" power to
suspend execution of a criminal sentence.' 2  The purpose of this
article is to analyze this perplexing situation and to present the
thesis that Oklahoma trial courts, irrespective of contrary statutory com-
mand, have the inherent judicial power to suspend execution of sen-
tence in criminal matters. 13
It is suggested that the effect of this inherent judicial power is to
nullify the directive nature of the Oklahoma murder statutes and render
ineffective the prohibition against the suspension of execution of sen-
tence in certain drug matters.'" The far-reaching effect of this prin-
ciple is that legislative enactments prohibiting suspension of sentence
are nugatory and that the elimination of discretion in applying the death
penalty sentence in murder cases is unobtainable,' 5 and the legislature
is powerless to direct a punishment-certain for criminal offenses by pro-
hibiting the suspension of sentence. Arguments concerning the de-
velopment of the Oklahoma common law judicial power to suspend the
execution of criminal sentences and the application of the separation
of powers doctrine to suspension by the trial court of execution of
criminal sentences will be presented to support the aforementioned
propositions.
11. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. See State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim.
94, 130 P. 962 (1913).
12. See Curry v. Page, 484 P.2d 887 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Chatman v. Page,
484 P.2d 537 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Buckley v. Page, 465 P.2d 769 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1970) (dissenting opinion). But see Davis v. State, 521 P.2d 422 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1974); Kovash v. State, 519 P.2d 517 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Disheroon v.
State, 514 P.2d 685 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Doyle v. State, 511 P.2d 1133 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1973); Williamson v. State, 510 P.2d 27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) and Black
v. State, 509 P.2d 941 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). Apparently, the power to suspend exe-
cution of sentence is found in the sole power of the courts alone to determine justiciable
matters. See ORs.a. CoNsr. art. VII, § 7.
13. Suspension of execution of sentence must not be confused with suspension of
imposition of sentence. In the suspension of imposition situation, the defendant is never
actually sentenced unless, of course, the conditions of the suspension are violated. Sus-
pension of imposition of sentence is similar to the deferred sentencing procedure au-
thorized by OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991c (1971). On the other hand, suspension of exe-
cution of sentence refers to the situation where the trial court sentences the defendant,
but suspends incarceration. Of course, if the conditions of suspension are violated, in-
carceration for the remainder of the term will result. See 21 Am. Jus. 2d Criminal Law
r§ 552-61 (1965) for a discussion of suspension of execution of sentence and suspension
of imposition of sentence.
14. See OxLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.1-.6 (Supp. 1974) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§
2-401 to-13 (1971).
15. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1975]
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMON LAW
Legislative History
Until 1970,16 it appeared certain that the power of a trial court
to suspend imposition or execution' 7 of a criminal sentence was
dependent upon legislative authorization.' 8 Even before statehood,
the Oklahoma Territory legislature authorized the trial courts to sus-
pend judgment and sentence in criminal cases.' 0 Moreover, the Court
of Criminal Appeals had consistently indicated that "the granting of a
suspended sentence is regulated solely by statute [and that] this power
did not exist in the court at common law. .... -20 However, the trial
court was limited to suspending the entire sentence, or not at all.2' Os-
tensibly, in search of more even justice, the legislature expanded the
latitude extended to the trial courts by adding the following language
to the existing sentencing statute:
[T]he judge may order any person so convicted to serve such
part of the sentence as the Trial Court shall determine fit and
proper and suspend the balance of the sentence during good
behavior .... 21
16. It was on February 18, 1970 that Judge Nix's strong dissent was filed in Buck-
ley v. Page, 465 P.2d 769 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970). The dissent caused considerable
doubt as to the inherent judicial power of a district judge to suspend all or any part
of a criminal sentence imposed by him.
17. See 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law §§ 552-61 (1965) for a discussion distin-
guishing suspension of "execution" of sentence and suspension of "imposition" of sen-
tence.
18. See Ex Parte Swain, 88 Okla. Crim. 235, 202 P.2d 223 (1949); State v. Smith,
83 Okla. Crim. 188, 174 P.2d 932 (1946); Ex Parte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122
P.2d 162 (1942). In Ex Parte Boyd, the court stated:
The granting of a suspended sentence is regulated solely by statute. This
power did not exist in the court at common law, and the language of the Okla-
homa statute is therefore material in determining the procedure to be followed.
73 Okla. Crim. at 448, 122 P.2d at 166. Actually, however, it is not clear whether the
court was referring to both suspension of imposition and suspension of execution of sen-
tence.
19. Law of March 3, 1903, ch. 18, § 1 [1903] Okla. Sess. Laws 196. The provision
applied only to youths 16 years of age or under, convicted of any felony other than
murder.
20. Ex Parte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 448, 122 P.2d 162, 166 (1942). But see
discussion under "Separation of Powers Doctrine" infra.
21. See State v. Smith, 83 Okla. Crim. 188, 174 P.2d 932 (1946). The court, in
construing the mentioned statute, held that the "[s]tatute authorizing [the] court to
suspend sentence does not authorize the suspension of just a portion of the judgment
and sentence, but if suspension is granted, it must be of [the] entire judgment." 83
Okla. Crim. at 189, 174 P.2d at 933 (court syllabus par. 5). Apparently, the court was
referring to suspension of "imposition" of sentence because of the language concerning
suspending the "entire judgment".
22. See OKRA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991 (Supp. 1963).
5
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As a result thereof, the trial courts began to exercise the statutory au-
thority to partially suspend execution of criminal sentences.
However, in 1967 the legislature, in an attempt to clarify the Okla-
homa law concerning corrections, passed the Oklahoma Corrections
Act2 3 which expressly repealed the previous sentencing statute. The
supplanting statute provided as follows:
Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, except when the
death sentence is imposed, the Court may (a) suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence with or without proba-
tion, . . .except that [section] (a) . .. shall not apply
upon the third or subsequent conviction of a felony.24
Significantly, the legislature, intentionally or otherwise, failed to pro-
vide the trial court authority to suspend either the imposition or the exe-
cution of a portion of a criminal sentence. Thus, the court's statutory
discretion was again restricted to suspending execution of the entire
sentence.
Buckley v. Page
Apparently, the trial court's lack of statutory power to partially sus-
pend a criminal sentence went unnoticed until the decision in Buckley
v. Page25 was handed down by the Court of Criminal Appeals in
February, 1970. In Buckley, the defendant had entered a guilty plea
pursuant to an agreement between the defendant's counsel and the
prosecutor. Essentially, the agreement was that "if [defendant] would
enter a plea of guilty, the prosecutor would recommend to the court
a sentence of sixteen years imprisonment with the last four years sus-
pended.'20  The trial court sentenced the defendant accordingly. 27
Later, although it is not clear from the case report how the matter
was raised, the defendant discovered that the trial court did not have
the statutory authority to suspend the execution of a portion of his sen-
tence and sought relief via a writ in the nature of habeas corpus 23 in
23. OKrLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 501-04 (Supp. 1967).
24. OKRLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 520 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
25. 465 P.2d 769 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
26. Id. at 770.
27. Id.
28. The defendant brought the matter to the attention of the appellate court through
a writ "in the nature of" habeas corpus. This was because OrLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1151
(1971) only authorizes the appellate courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for the pur-
pose of bringing a person before the court to testify or in discharge of bail. However,
the court treated the matter as one of seeking post conviction relief.
19751
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the Court of Criminal Appeals.2 9 He alleged that his plea of guilty
was improvidently entered." The court held that the "legislature...
has removed the authority of a sentencing court to suspend a portion
of the sentence imposed. . . [and] until changed by legislative act,
the courts upon sentencing are, as they were prior to 1963, without the
authority to suspend a portion of the sentence imposed." 31 Ostensibly,
in view of previous developments, the court was referring to both sus-
pension of "imposition" of sentence and suspension of "execution" of
sentence.
Apparently, because the appellate forum remanded the matter to
the trial court for further proceedings, the Buckley decision brought the
problem to the attention of the legislature. Swift action was taken to
amend section 991a of title 22 to read as follows:
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and no death
sentence is imposed, the court shall either:
(1) Suspend the execution of sentence in whole or in
part, with or without probation ....
Subsection (1) hereof shall not apply to persons being
sentenced upon their third or subsequent to their third con-
viction of a felony. 2
Significantly, the legislature extended the coverage of the statute to all
crimes, not just felonies, provided, however, that the death sentence
had not been imposed.33 Most importantly, the legislature authorized
a trial court to suspend execution of a portion of the sentence imposed.
Concomitantly, however, the statutory authority to suspend imposition
of sentence was deleted entirely. 4
Common Law Development
As a result of the foregoing amendment, it again appeared that
the suspension of sentence powers of the trial courts were satisfactorily
29. Buckley v. Page, 465 P.2d 769, 770 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
30. Id. at 771.
31. Id. at 770.
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971) (emphasis added).
33. It is interesting and important to note the relative sequence of enactment of
OxLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 991a (1971) (sentencing), OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 701.1-.6 (Supp.
1974) (homicide) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-401 to -13 (1971) (controlled dangerous
substances). Both the homicide and controlled dangerous substances provisions were
passed subsequent to the sentencing provision. Thus, the question of the effect of the
language in § 991a concerning its applicability to all crimes, except when the death pen-
alty is imposed, is raised.
34. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971).
[Vol. 11: 26
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delineated. However, apparently because of a terse, but strong dissent
to the Buckley decision,35 the matter was not at an end. Judge Kirk-
sey Nix, in a statement that was to become the seminal foundation for
the Oklahoma common law power of a trial court to suspend, in whole
or in part, execution of a criminal sentence, said:
I dissent in the . . . opinion by my learned colleagues
for the reason that I strongly feel that a District Judge is in-
vested with inherent power to suspend all or any part of the
sentence imposed by him."'
Clearly, Judge Nix was referring to suspension of execution of sentence
because he indicates that the judge's power extends to sentences al-
ready "imposed by him". The dissent had a significant impact because,
subsequently, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had occasion
to consider two cases similar to Buckley and reversed its position.
Chatman and Curry
In Chatman v. Page,37 Presiding Judge Hez Bussey, writing for the
court, stated:
At the time Buckley v. Page . . . was delivered, I was
reluctant to overrule the unbroken line of cases holding that
the trial court did not possess the authority to suspend the
execution of a sentence in part. Upon reconsideration, I am
compelled to agree with Judge Nix's dissent in Buckley.
I believe the interest of justice can best be served by
recognizing the power of a trial court to suspend the execu-
tion of a sentence either in whole or in part, and particularly
is this true when, as in the instant case, the prosecutor, de-
fense counsel, and the defendant labored under the misap-
prehension that the court possessed the inherent power to
impose the judgment and sentence pronounced.38
In Curry v. Page,39 the court expressly indicated that it intended to clar-
ify the Chatman ruling and stated:
[W]e specifically hold in the instant case, that absent legis-
lative authorization, a trial judge has the inherent power and
authority to suspend a judgment and sentence, either in whole
or in part, and in the exercise of his discretion, may suspend
a fine and costs, either in whole or in part.4
35. 465 P.2d at 771 (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. 484 P.2d 537 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
38. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
39. 484 P.2d 887 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
40. Id. at 888.
1975]
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The court further indicated that prior, inconsistent cases "are hereby
expressly overruled." 41  Significantly, there was no dissent filed in
either Chatman or Curry.
The full meaning and reach of Chatman and Curry must still be
determined, however. The principal question to be determined is
whether the court in Chatman and Curry meant that the trial court had
the inherent judicial power to suspend imposition of sentence or sus-
pend the execution of the sentence imposed. It is suggested that the
proper construction of the cases is the latter.
In Chatman, the court clearly indicated that it was reconsidering
the question of whether or not the trial court had the authority to sus-
pend the execution of a sentence in part,42 and held that the "interest
of justice can best be served by recognizing the power of a trial court
to suspend the execution of a sentence either in whole or in part
.... ,"3 Moreover, the court specifically referred to the Buckley dis-
sent wherein it is posited that the trial court judge has the "inherent
power to suspend . . . the sentence imposed by him."44  Thus, it is
clear that the court was considering the exercise and extent of judicial
power after a criminal sentence had already been imposed. Moreover,
the facts of the Chatman case require such a position.4" Further, al-
though the Curry decision contains some imprecise language, the Curry
court indicated that it was following the Chatman decision.4" There-
fore, it can be concluded, without serious reservation, that the court was
not considering the suspension of sentence imposition question, but had
decided that a trial court had the inherent judicial power to suspend
the execution of a criminal sentence.
It may be argued that the Chatman and Curry cases stand only
for the proposition that the trial court has the inherent judicial power
to partially suspend execution of a sentence "absent legislative author-
41. Id. The court said "[a~ll prior decisions of the Court to the contrary, are hereby
expressly overruled...."
42. 484 P.2d at 538.
43. Id.
44. 465 P.2d at 771 (dissenting opinion).
45. Roy D. Chatman, the defendant, was convicted in the District Court of Okla-
homa County on July 15, 1967, and received a five-year sentence, three years to be
served in the state penitentiary, and the last two years suspended. The defendant
pleaded guilty on February 17, 1970, to automobile theft and received a two-year sen-
tence, which he was serving. The defendant had been advised by the prison authorities
that, upon completion of his two-year term for auto theft, he would have to serve the
remaining two years of the two-year suspended sentence, and from said ruling he per-
fected a writ of habeas corpus to the Court of Criminal Appeals. 484 P.2d at 538.
46. 484 P.2d at 888.
[Vol. 11: 26
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ization." In other words, only if the legislature has failed to act, may
the trial court exercise its inherent power to suspend execution of a
portion of a sentence. However, this position is analytically incorrect
because the power to authorize suspension of sentence execution must
rest with only one branch of the state government under the Oklahoma
doctrine of separation of powers.47  Thus, if the judiciary has the in-
herent, mutually exclusive judicial power to suspend execution of crimi-
nal sentences, the legislature is prohibited from acting to inhibit the ex-
ercise of that power. Given the inherent judicial power to suspend
execution of a portion of a sentence, limiting the exercise of that power
to instances when the legislature has failed to act would be an inappro-
priate encroachment upon the judicial power.48 Therefore, the proper
construction of Chatman and Curry is that the inherent power to
suspend the execution of an imposed sentence rests with the judiciary
and legislative inaction is an irrevelant consideration.
It may be further argued that, considering the facts of the Buckley,
Chatman and Curry cases,4 9 the power to suspend execution of an im-
posed criminal sentence extends only to partial suspensions. Although
the remarks of the court must be considered gratis dictum in this re-
gard, analysis demands that the inherent power of a trial court to sus-
pend execution of a criminal sentence extends to the entire sentence.
Moreover, this was the view expressed by Judge Nix in his seminal
Buckley dissent."0 Fundamentally, Judge Nix's view was fully ac-
cepted by the court in Chatman.
There is no logical reason why the trial court would have the in-
herent power to suspend execution of a portion of a sentence and not
have the power to suspend execution in its entirety. The funda-
mental reason presented by the court in Chatman for allowing partial
47. OKLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided
into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and
except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall ex-
ercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.
See discussion under "Separation of Powers Doctrine" infra.
48. Id.
49. The facts of the Buckley, Chatman, and Curry cases are similar in the respect
that all the defendants concerned entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge believing
that a "bargained for" partial sentence suspension would be granted by the court. Ap-
parently, the plea of guilty was in exchange for a promise by the prosecutor to recom-
mend to the trial court that the defendant receive a suspended sentence and be placed
on probation. Apparently, none of the parties involved were aware of the statutory lim-
itations to suspending sentences.
50. 465 P.2d at 771 (dissenting opinion).
19751
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suspension of execution of sentences is the "interest of justice."5 1  It
is suggested that this principle is equally applicable to partial and entire
suspensions. The trial court is in the best position to determine
the magnitude of the sentence to be imposed and actually served
in a criminal matter."2 In a deserving case, in the interest of justice,
the trial court may determine that the "threat" of incarceration alone is
sufficient to enable the convicted defendant to return to society for a
productive life free of future criminal activity. On the other hand, how-
ever, in the aggravated case where the character of the convicted in-
dividual is devoid of socially acceptable qualities and the facts of the
matter at trial are especially reprehensible, the trial judge may deter-
mine that incarceration is the only course of action that is consistent
with the interests of justice. Obviously, all cases do not fall in the ex-
treme categories of incarceration or suspension of execution of sen-
tence. It is the cases that fall within the two extremities that the "in-
terests of justice" require the trial court to be empowered with the
authority to suspend execution of a portion of an imposed sentence.58
Moreover, simple logic suggests that the power to suspend execution
of a sentence in its entirety is the source of the power for partial sus-
pensions. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Chatman and Curry
cases are firmly grounded upon the inherent judicial power of the trial
court to suspend execution of the entirety of an imposed criminal sen-
tence, and are not limited to partial suspensions.
Black v. State
The matter again appeared to be settled after the Chatman and
Curry cases. However, almost two years later the Court of Criminal
51. 484 P.2d at 538.
52. In Oklahoma, the jury imposes sentence in a substantial portion of criminal
cases pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 926-8 (1971). In accordance with these stat-
utes, when the jury imposes sentence, the trial court is bound to render judgment accord-
ingly. However, it appears that later statutes, e.g., OIMA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971),
which appear to vest considerable discretion in the trial court, substantially mitigate the
effect of earlier statutes giving sentencing powers to the jury. Under the authority of
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 991a (1971), a trial judge can suspend "execution" of any punish-
ment imposed by a jury. Obviously, the trial judge has the power to render a jury sen-
tence ineffective. For example, whenever the trial court determines that the jury-im-
posed sentence is excessive, he can, at his discretion, suspend execution of any amount
which he considers excessive. See Ex Parte Tartar, 94 Okla. Crim. 103, 231 P.2d 709
(1951) and Bean v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 73, 138 P.2d 563 (1943) for discussion of
this matter before enactment of present sentencing statutes.
53. It was this very consideration that moved the Oklahoma legislature to reinstate
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Appeals had occasion to reconsider the matter in Black v. State." In
Black, the defendant, apparently believing that he would be considered
for a suspended sentence and placed on probation,55 entered a plea of
guilty to a violation of section 2-401.B.2 of title 63.56 However, that
section contained the following sentencing prohibition:
Such sentence shall not be subject to statutory provisions for
suspended sentences, deferred sentences or probation.5
Inter alia,55 the defendant argued that the section was violative of the
Oklahoma constitution and that the "[1]egislature .. . exceeded its
constitutionally limited powers by invading the judicial domain
.* ,, 50 by attempting to circumscribe the power of the trial court to
suspend execution of sentence and grant probation.6" The court ruled
that the prohibitory statutory provision was consistent with the Okla-
homa constitution and affirmed the conviction.6
The opinion, oddly enough written by the author of the Chatman
and Curry opinions,"2 is inconsistent with the earlier cases and will not
withstand analysis. The court based its decision upon two considera-
tions: One, that the facts of the Chatman and Curry cases are distin-
guishable and, two, that probation is a matter of legislative grace.63
The court attempted to distinguish the Chatman and Curry cases
by saying:
In Curry and Chatman,. . . the trial court suspended a por-
tion of the sentence without statutory authority to do so,
wherein [sic] the instant case there is an expressed statutory
prohibition against a suspended sentence. 4
As previously established, the Chatman and Curry cases firmly indi-
cated that the trial court had the inherent judicial authority to suspend
execution of an imposed criminal sentence. Given that the power to
54. 509 P.2d 941 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
55. Id. at 943 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id.
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401.B.2 (1971) (emphasis added).
58. In addition to the argument that the sentencing prohibition in § 2-401.B.2 of
title 63 is violative of the separation of powers doctrine, the defendant argued that "the
denial of the possibility of probation" resulted in cruel and unusual punishment and vio-
lated constitutional requirements for substantive due process and equal protection under
the laws. 509 P.2d at 942.
59. 509 P.2d at 942.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 943.
62. Judge Hez Bussey.
63. Black v. State, 509 P.2d 941, 942 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
64. 509 P.2d at 942.
1975]
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suspend execution of sentence exists, it is clear that the power is a judi-
cial power and beyond the reach of the legislature.05 Thus, any attempt
to curtail the exercise of the judicial power to suspend execution of
criminal sentences by the legislature is clearly ineffective, 0 and the
trial court is free to exercise its judicial power to suspend execution of
sentences, regardless of statutory prohibitions. Realistically, therefore,
the Black case is not distinguishable from Chatman and Curry.
Apparently, the legislature was aware of its inability to encroach
upon the judicial power in the instant matter because the prohibition
of suspending sentences, deferring sentencing or granting probation ex-
tended only to "statutory provisions. ' 67  Ostensibly, the legislature was
referring to the pertinent portions of sections 991a and 991e of title
22. It appears that the court simply failed to read the statute in ques-
tion and consider the rationale of its previous decisions.
The second basis for denying the defendant's appeal was that pro-
bation is a matter of legislative grace. Unfortunately, the court equated
probation with sentence suspension. 5  According to Black's Law Dic-
tionary, sentence suspension refers to either the "withholding or post-
poning [of] the sentencing of a prisoner after the conviction, or a post-
poning of the execution of the sentence after it has been pro-
nounced."' 9 On the other hand, probation is "allowing a person con-
victed. . . to go at large, under a suspension of sentence, during good
behavior, and generally under the supervision or guardianship of a pro-
bation officer.17 0  This distinction is well recognized in the Oklahoma
statutes. 7'1 Moreover, the court relied upon inappropriate federal au-
thority for the proposition that probation is a matter of legislative
grace. 7 2  Therefore, the court's analysis of this matter was inapposite
65. OKLA. CONsTr. art. IV, § 1 provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided
into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and
except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall ex-
ercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.
See also In re Opinion of the Judges, 25 Okla. 76, 105 P. 325 (1909).
66. See State Bar Commission ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 P.
703 (1912); and In re Opinion of the Judges, 25 Okla. 76, 105 P. 325 (1909).
67. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-401.B.1 (1971).
68. 509 P.2d at 942.
69. BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 1529 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
70. Id. at 1367.
71. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a (1971).
72. 509 P.2d at 942. The court relied upon, and quoted, Lathem v. United States,
259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958). The court's reliance upon this case construing federal
probation is misplaced primarily because there is no similarity between the United States
[V'ol. 11:26
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because sentence suspension and probation are conceptually distin-
guishable.
Moreover, the court's analysis of sentence suspension was not re-
sponsive to the defendant's objection to the "denial of the possibility
of probation ' 73 due to the prohibition against suspended sentences.
The court said "that the Legislature properly exercised its power to pro-
hibit suspension of a sentence in a given case as an inherent part of
its power to prescribe punishment for the acts which it has prohibited
as criminal.17 4 This statement is analytically incorrect because, assum-
ing arguendo that probation and the "denial of the possibility of proba-
tion" are within the legislative power, the exercise of that power has no
relationship whatsoever to the exercise of the inherent power of the
judiciary to grant a suspension of execution of sentence. There is no
requirement that probation be a condition of the suspension of execu-
tion of sentence. 75  Moreover, it appears that the judiciary could
obviate the exercise of any legislative power concerning probation be-
cause the trial court is free to attach whatever conditions it deems
necessary to the suspension of execution of a criminal sentence.76
Thus, although probation and sentence suspension are conceptually dis-
tinguishable, the trial court may attach equivalent conditions to suspen-
Constitution and the Oklahoma constitution in respect to the separation of powers of
the various departments of government. The Oklahoma constitution contains clear, im-
perative language establishing independent departments of government. OKLA. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. Similar language cannot be found in the United States Constitution.
73. 509 P.2d at 942.
74. Id.
75. Suspension of execution of sentence in a criminal matter is purely an act of ju-
dicial grace. Gore v. State, 482 P.2d 953 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). Moreover, the de-
cision to grant a suspension with or without probation is within the discretion of the
sentencing court. Sargent v. State, 509 P.2d 143 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
76. See Jackson v. State, 497 P.2d 475 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
The trial court may prescribe certain conditions be met by the convicted
individual before a suspended sentence is granted . . . . For example, the
court may require the convicted individual to make restitution to any parties
legally injured because of his illegal act. Moreover, the court may prescribe
conditions of conduct during the period of suspension or probation. If the
court neglects to enunciate specified conditions, some conditions are so funda-
mental that revocation will follow upon violation. For instance, it is consid-
ered basic and fundamental that a person may not commit a felony while
under suspension or on probation. Generally, any condition which a reason-
able man would ascertain to be fundamental is an implied condition for suspen-
sion or probation. However, it must be noted that a suspended sentence may
not be revoked unless competent evidence is produced at an adversary hearing.
The person against whom revocation proceedings are being brought has the
right to confront adverse witnesses and to enter favorable evidence. Moreover,
an order revoking a suspended sentence is subject to appeal.
Fairbanks, Parole-A Function of the Judiciary?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 634, 640-41 (1974)
(footnotes omitted).
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sion of execution of sentence without legislative authorization. There-
fore, it appears that the power to suspend execution of a criminal sen-
tence carries a concomitant power to attach probation-like conditions
to such a suspension.
SEPARATION OF PowERs DOCTRINE
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that case decisions of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals establish the principle that the
state trial courts have the inherent judicial power to suspend the
execution of a criminal sentence. However, it remains to be de-
termined whether or not this position will withstand analysis.
Source of Separate Powers
The source of the Oklahoma separation of powers doctrine is
article IV of the Oklahoma constitution. Article IV provides the
following:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma
shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legis-
lative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this
Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial depart-
ments of government shall be separate and distinct, and
neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either
of the others.7"
The courts have had little difficulty in construing article IV and have
consistently held that the three segments of Oklahoma government are
"independent . . . and sovereign within their respective spheres."78
Moreover, one branch of state government cannot exercise the powers
that "properly" belong to another and, further, each branch has the
responsibility to insure that it does not encroach upon the duties and
responsibilities of the others. 9
Whatever its limitations and character, the "judicial power of
[the] court has its origin in the Constitution, but when the court came
into existence, it came with inherent powers. Such power is the right
to protect itself [and] to enable it to administer justice whether any
previous . . . remedy has been granted or not."81' The legislature
77. OKLA. CONSr. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
78. In re Opinion of the Judges, 25 Okla. 76, 105 P. 325 (1909).
79. Id.
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cannot act in any manner to abolish, either directly or indirectly, those
powers which were possessed by courts of similar jurisdiction at
common law and which vested in the court by virtue of its very estab-
lishment by the constitution."1 Therefore, it is clear that those powers
belonging to the judiciary can be exercised by the judiciary alone and
the exercise of those powers cannot be encumbered by the legislature.
Judicial Power
The fundamental source of judicial power is found in the judi-
ciary's primary responsibility for the proper and efficient administration
of justice."' This is an awesome responsibility and to that end the
judiciary has the inherent power to determine and regulate those
matters that are "essential to [its] existence [and] dignity." 3  Or
stated another way, whenever anything is "so intimately connected and
bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of
justice . . . the right to define and regulate [the matter] is inherent
to the judicial department and belongs to the. . . Court."8 4 Thus, the
judiciary possesses whatever power necessary to insure that it is able
to fulfill its primal duty of administering proper and efficient justice.
Considering the above, there are at least two basic considerations
that must be examined in determining whether the power of
suspension of execution of a criminal sentence rests within the inherent
power of the judiciary. The considerations are: (1) The matter must
be intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power in the
administration of justice, and (2) The matter must be essential to its
continued existence and dignity.
Judicial Power Application
Although some Oklahoma cases indicated otherwise, 5 the judicial
authority to suspend execution of sentence existed at common law.86
81. State Bar Comm'n ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 764, 131 P. 703,
711 (1912).
82. ln re Integration of the State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 507, 95 P.2d
113, 115 (1939).
83. Ford v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections, 431 P.2d 423, 428 (Okla. 1967).
84. In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939)
(court syllabus par. 2).
85. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 83 Okla. Crim. 188, 193, 174 P.2d 932, 934 (1946).
86. See J. CHrry, Tun CRImiNAL LAW 757 et seq. (1836), and authorities cited
therein, for a full discussion of the common law judicial power to suspend execution of
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Generally, however, such authority applied only in capital offense
cases. 7  Chitty gave this account of the common law practice of
reprieves ex arbitrio judicis:
If the defendant does not succeed in reversing the judg-
ment, there are yet. . . modes by which he can stay or.pre-
vent its execution. The first of these [is] . . . a reprieve,
which merely delays the execution ....
The term reprieve is derived from reprendre, to keep
back, and signifies the withdrawing of the sentence for an in-
terval of time, and operates in delay of execution. It is
granted. . . by. . . the judge before whom the prisoner is
tried on his behalf, or from the regular operation of law, in
circumstances which render an immediate execution incon-
sistent with humanity or justice.
the . . . usual course is, for a discretionary re-
prieve to proceed from the judge himself, who, from his ac-
quaintance with all the circumstances of the trial, is most cap-
able of judging when it is proper. The power of granting
this respite belongs, of common right, to every tribunal which
is invested with authority to award execution. And, this
power exists even in case of high treason, though the judge
should be very prudent in its exercise .... 88
Thus, it appears that the practice of granting reprieves ex arbitrio
judicis at common law is substantially equivalent to the current practice
of suspending execution of a criminal sentence. Moreover, the circum-
stances which elicit the exercise of the judicial power to suspend execu-
tion of a sentence have not changed substantially since the early
practice. Lord Hale reported:
Sometimes the judge reprieves before judgment, as
where he is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is
uncertain, or the indictment is insufficient, or doubtful
whether within clergy; also, when favorable or extenuating
circumstances appear, and when youths are convicted of theirfirst offense. And these arbitrary reprieves may be granted
or taken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although their
sessions be adjourned or finished; and this, by reason of
common usage.89
The importance of the foregoing is to demonstrate that the judicial
power to grant a suspension of execution of sentence has been
87. J. C nry, THE CRImINAL LAW 757 (1836).
88. Id. 757-8.
89. 2 HALE, P.C. 412 (Circa. 1670) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 11:26
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"intimately connected" with the exercise of the judicial function since
the earliest moments of the common law courts.
Equally as important is the fact that suspension of execution of
sentence is inextricably "bound up with the exercise of judicial power
in the administration of justice" 0 and any limitations in this regard
would seriously affect the vitality of the judicial system. In order that
justice can be properly administered in the varied factual situations that
come before the trial courts, it is absolutely required that the trial court
have the power to suspend execution of sentence in the proper caseY1
It is through the exercise of this power that the judiciary can best at-
tempt to assure that "favorable and extenuating circumstances" are
considered in each case and, therefore, properly administer fair
and equitable justice. Moreover, if this power were abrogated, either
through legislative encroachment or judicial abdication, it is doubt-
ful that fair and equitable justice could be attained. Therefore,
it is clear that should the inherent judicial power to suspend execution
of sentence be limited, by whatever means or in any respect, the very
existence of the judiciary as the repositor and protector of fair and
equitable justice would be severely threatened.
From the foregoing, it can be reasonably concluded that the
judicial power to suspend execution of a criminal sentence is a requisite
to the continued vitality of the judiciary and is essential to the admin-
istration of justice by the judiciary.
CONCLUSIONS
In the final analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals has created
two divergent lines of authority concerning the power of a trial court
to suspend execution of a criminal sentence. The persuasive line of
cases, specifically Chatman and Curry, holds that an Oklahoma trial
court has the inherent judicial power to suspend execution of a criminal
sentence. The validity of this line of authority is supported by the fact
that section 991a of title 22, the statutory provision concerning
suspended sentences, was the statute under consideration and would,
hopefully, give rise to a more reasoned analysis of suspension of
90. In re Integration of the State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113
(1939) (court syllabus par. 2).
91. See I. CHrrr, THE CRimiNAL LAW 757 et seq. (1836) for a full discussion of
the variety of situations that called upon the common law trial courts to exercise their
inherent judicial power to suspend execution of sentence. Importantly, the same factual
situations are relevant today.
1975]
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sentences. The other line of cases, emanating from Black v. State, is
hardly convincing and does not present viable reasons for allowing the
legislature to encroach upon the judicial power to suspend execution
of criminal sentences and is tainted with a significant underlying con-
sideration of the public's interest in controlling the use of dangerous
drugs. Moreover, the judicial power to suspend execution of a criminal
sentence is a requirement for the continued vitality of the judiciary as
a separate and distinct department of state government and is essential
to the fair and equitable administration of justice by the judiciary.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Oklahoma trial courts have the
inherent judicial power to suspend execution of a criminal sentence and
that the exercise of this power negates the directive language of the
Oklahoma murder statutes and renders ineffective the legislative
prohibition against the suspension of execution in certain drug matters.
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